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Abstract 
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) has potential for application in the new field of 
telemedicine, as the use of radio waves offers advantages over traditional optical 
technology such as bar codes.  Radio waves are not limited by line of sight, they can 
penetrate objects and communicate in a wireless fashion. However, the same advantage is 
also the inherent weakness, as radio waves are susceptible to attack.  Ongoing efforts 
have identified forward secure chain hashing as a viable security protocol for RFID 
authentication.  Today’s typical RFID communications take place with the “host-reader-
tag” arrangement where the computational requirements are performed by a back end 
server system which holds all the intelligence and houses all records for an entire facility.  
One server can easily utilize multiple readers, but a compromise of this single system 
could have serious ramifications.  Why not make a smaller system that is more robust and 
tolerant of intrusion.  This can be achieved by implementing a stand alone reader that 
relies only on itself.  We propose a server-less system that can accomplish the same 
results.  Because our enhanced reader does not require a server to perform its function, if 
any readers are breached it only impacts that specific reader, not the entire server.  By 
eliminating the resource heavy server device, we can yield a more robust overall system.  
We have selected a forward secure protocol to implement on an embedded platform that 
will be able to authenticate a tag without the resources of a back end server.   
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1. Description 
Many people have experienced the commercial use of encrypted RFID in today’s 
commerce, such as the toll collection system “EZPass” or the “SpeedPass” payment 
system by Exxon-Mobil.  SpeedPass uses the Digital Signature Transponder (DST) 
manufactured by Texas Instruments (TI).  DST is a cryptographically enabled passive 
RFID device using a block cipher to implement a challenge-response authentication 
scheme.  Despite using a cipher text to exchange data with the reader, the fact remains 
that the data interaction was performed on an open broadcast rendering the unprotected 
tag vulnerable to any compatible reader.  This authentication protocol was defeated in 
2005 [5] with a TI evaluation kit. 
The operational premise of RFID is based on wireless transmissions over open 
radio waves, which is also the appeal for unauthorized access by an adversary.  
Acknowledging the possibility of attack, we shall consider the wireless exchange as 
compromised and include it in the development parameters.  These parameters also 
consider tag anonymity, the ability to prevent tag tracking, low cost of computational 
resources, and means to keep previous information secure going forward.  We explore 
previous works that have successfully addressed these criteria.  The work in [6] proposes 
a matrix algorithm which is adaptable to the embedded platform, but passive tags lack the 
ability to operate a timer as specified, while [3] proposes an XOR scheme sharing 
random keys in a common list which require frequent overwriting of the complete list has 
failed to maintain security when not updated by the users. 
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In [1], [21], Ohkuno et al. state the criterion for a secure system includes 
indistinguishability, non- tracking, low-cost and forward-secure protocol.  They propose 
the use of a one way function to circumvent the adversary tampering and implement a 
protocol that ensures the users privacy using a hash scheme.  This method satisfies the 
low cost requirement and is adaptable to RFID use. 
Luo et al. build upon [1] by adding on mutual authentication protocol [2].  This 
work describes how to make the tag output non-constant using a randomized key thereby 
securing the data interaction between the reader and tag.  Though the work is sound, [2] 
needs to synchronize the reader and tag using a PRNG, which is cost prohibitive for 
implementation on a low cost tag, therefore, was not considered for our implementation. 
Of the work researched, [1] has the best approach for our proposed thesis.  We 
will implement an embedded system using an 8bit microcontroller as an alternative to the 
traditional back end server that can be as effective in the RFID information exchange 
while limiting the potential of wide scale data breach.  The work in this thesis will 
contribute to the security concerns stated by providing a lower cost alternative to the back 
end server setup that is able to keep information previously sent from being revealed in 
the future. 
 
1.2. Radio Frequency Identification 
RFID has been in existence since WWII but was too costly to be considered for 
widespread use in industry.  In recent years the acronym has become more commonplace 
and come forward to be an acceptable means of identification technology.  As important 
technology eventually does, RFID has found its way in to commerce and is being 
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integrated into many areas in various forms.  One may be using RFID in daily activities 
and not be aware of it.  Libraries are using the technology for checkouts, shipping centers 
are using the technology for package tracking or work environments use RFID in the 
employee identification badges that grant building access to its personnel or perhaps a 
major credit card is embedded with a RFID device that does not need to be swiped to 
make a transaction.   
In basic terms, RFID is a means to identify of one or more objects with the use of 
radio frequency waves.  To make use of RFID technology there are three essential 
components required, these systems are discussed further in Section 2.1. 
 
1.3. Tags 
Tags, sometimes called transponders, are simple integrated circuits combined 
with an antenna that is tuned to receive a specific radio frequency and has the ability to 
be programmed with data for identification.  A tag will receive a carrier signal from the 
reader and reflect a wave back to the reader encoded with the data requested.  Tags 
respond to signals from any device that provides the correct modulation and instruction.    
Tag memory can be read-write, read-only or “write once, read many” (WORM).  
Read-write tags have a serial number encoded that may not be modified and have 
additional blocks of data to store information available to the end user. Read-only tags 
have data programmed on them during the manufacturing process and can never be 
modified. WORM tags can have a non-modifiable serial number written to them once 
that is read numerous times.   
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Tags are available in a wide variety of form factors that range in size from the size 
of a grain of rice to a standard sheet of paper.  The most common frequencies are low-
frequency at around 125 KHz, high-frequency at 13.56 MHz and ultra-high-frequency at 
860-960 MHz.  Each frequency range has its advantages and is better suited for the 
particular applications where they will be deployed.   
 
 
Figure 1.1.  Adhesive RFID label used in packaging industry (1.5 x 1.7 inches) 
 
All tags can be generalized under two categories, active and passive, described in 
the next sections.   
 
1.3.1 Active tags 
Active tags are powered with an internal battery to increase the effective 
operating range and usually support features that passive systems do not, such as analog 
sensors.  Although the active tag is capable of greater range and additional functionality, 
there are several disadvantages.  One limitation is the larger physical size requirements, 
and more importantly, its finite service life dictated by the battery and associated 
maintenance costs.  
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 1.3.2 Passive tags 
Passive tags are more prevalent and use a coiled antenna to create a magnetic field 
by capturing the readers radiated RF signal.  The field is used to power up the tag 
circuitry and respond to the reader.  Since passive tags rely on the reader for their 
operating power, they can potentially be held in service indefinitely.  Passive tags are 
generally small in size and have a lower cost compared to active tags.  
 
1.4. Readers 
Readers, also known as interrogators, are transceiver devices that are used to 
interface with the tags through the antenna.  Chip manufactures have started to offer IC’s 
that consolidate much of the analog circuitry making readers compact, easy to 
incorporate and affordable.  Readers are more of a relay device than a computing device; 
they require an intelligent host to instruct them on their actions and to make use of the 
data received from a tag.  To retrieve the unique data on a tag, the tag must be scanned 
and decoded by a reader.   
Scanning is a process initiated by the reader emitting a radio frequency (RF) 
signal that travels a short distance.  When the tag passes through the electromagnetic field 
of the antenna, it is activated and performs the function requested by the reader.  The 
radio waves backscattered from the tag are then converted to digital information by the 
reader circuitry and processed accordingly. We will use a transponder, which is a passive 
tag capable of read/write memory operations in the high frequency range. 
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 1.5. Telemedicine 
Telemedicine is the use of use of communication technology for the delivery of 
medical consultation or procedures at a distance.  The appeal of telemedicine is that has 
the ability to bring primary and specialty medical care into remote areas.  The potential to 
help patients who live hours from basic medical care services, and would otherwise not 
be able to get to a medical facility, is enormous; it enables the patient to directly access 
quality medical professionals without leaving their communities.  Telemedicine is not 
only restricted to patient use, medical specialists in off-site locations would be able to 
provide consulting services to onsite staff.   
One example of the applications for telemedicine is an assisted living facility.  
The assisted living facility would benefit from promoting and offering virtual office visits 
with medical professionals from the facility.  This is good for the living facilities ability 
to attract residents and increases the potential number of care sessions the resident could 
receive without actually leaving the facility.  There is no need for the patient to be 
transported to the care giver and eliminates the logistics involved for the transportation.  
The virtual visit can also reduce the stress for the patient.  Perhaps the patient has a 
condition that they wish to keep private as not to burden family members or they simply 
want to keep their affairs to themselves.  Or perhaps the care giver at the living facility is 
a general practitioner or physicians assistant and needs to consult with a specialist; this 
ability would greatly increases the care available to the residents. 
Another example is telepharmacy services.  Telepharmacy can offer remote 
pharmacist controlled dispensing systems.  This ability can bring pharmacist counseling 
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to the point of care and provide real-time medication dispensing.  Have you ever had a 
prescription filled and not used the entire quantity?  This could reduce the wasted product 
and save money for both patient and provider.  Telepharmacy could expand the service 
area without the expense of traditional “brick and mortar” buildings and maximize staff 
utilization.  One pharmacist can serve many locations rather than one per building which 
again saves money and resources. 
Telemedicine enables the treatment process to begin much faster than traditional 
care requiring the patient to travel sometimes long distances to be physically present at a 
care facility.   
 
1.6. Challenges 
Although technology forecasts better health care, advances in the field are not 
without concerns.  One major obstacle has been the issue of safeguarding the integrity, 
security, and privacy of healthcare information that is transmitted and stored 
electronically when using telemedicine services.  There is a need for a reliable means of 
ensuring patient confidentiality in the telemedicine data exchange.  This shortcoming is a 
primary concern when used in the context of telemedicine.  A security gap exists in 
identity verification when the patient is not physically present to confirm that the patient 
is indeed who they claim to be.   
Currently the method of disclosure in healthcare holds the patient identification 
confidential, not the patient care information.  Keeping with the practiced disclosure 
method of the day, the focus here is on the security of the patient’s identity for which the 
tag is issued, not the entire system from tag to server.  This thesis investigates the reader-
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to-tag information exchange and implements a light weight security protocol to safeguard 
the patient’s identity. 
 
1.7. Overview 
The aim of this thesis is to explore the use of an established hash function algorithm 
suitable for service in a traditional server-reader-tag system and apply that concept to an 
embedded system without loss of effectiveness.  Chapter 2, System Considerations, 
discusses the various configurations possible for our proposed RFID system.  Chapter 3, 
System Design, discusses our selected system configuration.  Chapter 4, Security 
Protocol, provides overview of what forward secure chain hashing is and reviews the 
work done by [1][21] which is the basis of this thesis.  It also discusses the selected 
hashing algorithms and how our RFID tags are authenticated.  Chapter 5, Work 
Environments, reviews the console application fshash, the embedded firmware, the user 
interface SerialComm, and the respective development tools used.  Chapter 6, Embedded 
Code, presents a high level software state diagram for the firmware, the firmware, data 
structures, and messaging formats.  Chapter 7, Testing and Results, provides summary of 
results for the range of operation, system performance results and cost of the system.  
Chapter 8, Conclusion, summarizes the accomplishments of this work and provides 
suggestions for future enhancements.  
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Chapter 2 System Considerations 
2.1. Typical RFID system 
RFID systems deployed today have at minimum three components consisting of a 
host, reader and tag.  The host or back end server provides the intelligence of the system 
and stores a data base of values that are associated with the tags for identification 
purposes.  The reader sends requests and demodulates responses and the tag is attached to 
the object to be identified.   There can be one or many readers configured for use with the 
single host and there are many tags.  The amount of information stored in the database is 
only limited by the resources of the back end server. 
 
`
Reader with 
Antenna
Tag
Host
 
 
Figure 2.1  Basic RFID system in use today 
  
 The typical system is a good choice for non-critical applications such as the 
packaging industry where it is not vital to conceal a customer’s shipping information, but 
this arrangement is not well suited for our use in telemedicine where patient ID must be 
hidden.  In the next section, we will investigate a more appropriate setup for use with our 
RFID system.   
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2.2. RFID system configuration options 
We plan to implement a system that does not need the back end server a typical 
system requires.  To do this, we will use a microcontroller to provide the intelligence and 
communications with the peripheral components.  Most microcontrollers have a serial 
communication port which will allow for interfacing with common devices.   
The reader, tag and display make our system.  The main component of our 
system, the reader, consists of the microcontroller, a RFID module and an integrated 
antenna.  The tags are purchased read/write capable passive tags and there are several 
choices of displays to receive the reader response.  These three are the most common, but 
this is not an exhaustive list.  As shown in Figure 2.2, the display can be a computer that 
is connected to the internet, wireless transmitters, or cell phones.  Essentially the 
transmission to be received from the reader needs to have a path back to the user.   
 
 
 
Figure 2.2  Transmission path options 
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2.2.1 Cell phones 
se cell phones for display, there must be an adaptor from cell phone 
to reader and platform specific software on the receiving cell phone. The microcontroller 
can provide ASCII text to the reader side cell phone via a serial-to-USB device which can 
then be forwarded to the user’s cell phone.  The advantage of this is that there are many 
cell phones currently in use and the physical location to call in or provide an office visit 
can be almost anywhere.  The communication medium offers great flexibility, however, 
the disadvantage is that there must be cell service in the area.  Of course there are satellite 
service options available, but our application was targeted towards remote areas which 
more often would not have such resources available.    
 
.2.2 Internet 
e internet there must be a serial-to-Ethernet device on the reader to route 
the packets to the user’s/care providers internet enabled display.  These devices are 
readily available as add on modules from many vendors and can be incorporated in to 
existing designs easily as they use the same serial output from the microcontroller 
without modifications.  This capability would literally enable world wide deployment and 
may possibly appeal more to the care provider than the patient.  Similar to the cellular 
service discussed previously, it implies that there must be an internet service provider and 
access to the internet, which is not typically associated with the remote areas targeted. 
 
In order to u
2
To use th
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2.2.3 Wireless transmitter 
   To use the transmitter there must be a means to forward the readers ASCII output, 
ideally with a DB9 serial connection.  This would be a simple device that could be 
attached or interchanged with a different radio or possible mixed with radios of different 
models.  Radios do not need any specific connection services, as required cell phones or 
the internet, and they provide a good option for service in remote areas.  However, the 
radio may be limited by the distance it can transmit or the geography of a region where it 
is deployed. 
 
2.2.4 Transmission encryption 
 It is possible to encrypt this transmission by selecting a microcontroller with a 
built in encryption engine, such as the AVR® XMEGA series from Atmel®.  These 
devices have cryptography support for AES and DES.  This would add another level of 
security to the data exchanged and prevent attackers from obtaining the information.  To 
use this functionality, an appropriate utility must be used on the receiver side to correctly 
decrypt the responses. 
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Chapter 3 System Design 
From the several options and possible configurations we have shown, we have decided to 
employ a system that uses a wireless radio.  The interface to the radio is simple a DB9 
connection and the radios do not require the additional overhead of specific software for 
the internet or cell phone device.  Also, the microcontroller we have selected does not 
have an encryption engine; this decision was made because of the frequency hopping 
operation of our chosen radio and inventory on hand.  
 
`
Reader
 
Figure 3.1  Selected transmission configuration 
 
 
3.1. RFID reader  
The reader is considered a single component, but it is comprised of several 
components; a block diagram of the device is shown in Figure 3.2.   The details for each 
are listed in the Sections 3.1.4 through 3.1.3. 
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DB9 
 
MAX232 
 
ATmega64 
 
RW-210 
LEDs 
Figure 3.2  RFID r  block diagram eader
 
Figure 3.3.  Complete RFID reader device 
 
 
3.1.1 
system.  This micro is capable of handling the same computational workload needed, but 
ATmega64 microcontroller 
The microcontroller is replacing the back-end server in the traditional RFID 
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is scaled down in its available memory.  We selected the Atmel® ATmega64 
microprocessor [16] for our reader for the following attributes:  
 64k bytes of reprogrammable flash memory 
 4k bytes of SRAM 
 2k bytes of NV memory rated for 100,000 write/erase cycles 
 SPI interface for in-system programming 
 JTAG on-chip debug support 
 two dedicated programmable serial communication ports 
 software selectable clock frequency 
 programming lock for security 
 rated for 100 year data retention (normal ambient conditions) 
In addition to the no-cost software development tool, the primary reason for 
selecting this component was the anticipated size of firmware to be used.  It was expected 
that there would be need for a substantial of amount memory for the porting of the two 
hashing algorithms used and a large amount of memory for text strings used in the host 
communications.  The chip comes in a 64pin TQFP package and readily available from 
major distributors. 
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 Figure 3.4.  ATmega64 mounted on TQFP to DIP adaptor 
 
Communications between the ATmega64 and RW-210 are not encrypted.  This is 
considered internal communications for the reader device and not exposed to the outside 
world.  These communications take place on circuit board traces and are not sent 
wirelessly, therefore they are considered secure. 
   
3.1.2 LED visual indicators 
There are four LED lights on the reader for the benefit of visual confirmation of 
the various operations performed.  The LEDs are controlled by the microcontroller, as the 
code enters the different states. 
LED0: Indicates PROGRAMMING MODE, this LED will light up and 
remain lit until the patient ID and tag programming is completed.  
This is the LED placed adjacent to the reset pushbutton.   
LED1: Indicates when the reader is expecting a tag to be scanned, it will flash 
once per second until a tag is scanned. 
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LED2: Indicates whether the tag authentication was successful.  It will remain 
lit for a one long second duration. 
LED3: Indicates whether the tag authentication failed.  It will remain lit for a 
one second long duration. 
 LED 0 
Figure 3.5.  LED bank for visual aid 
 
When the system is powered on, all four LEDs will flash in order (3 to 0, 0 to 3) 
several times to indicate the system has been successful initialized and is ready for use. 
 
3.1.3 Serial Converter 
This is the one of the standard components used in industry for serial-to-TTL 
conversions.  This converter, a Maxim MAX233CPP, or any other converter, is required 
for interfacing the reader with the outside world and in our configuration, the 
SerialComm user interface running on our display.  Given this communication is sent to 
the outside world, it can be intercepted at this physical point in the circuit.  This is the 
portion that would benefit from the encryption engine that would be available on the 
microcontroller. 
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3.1.4 RFID module 
RW-210 RFID Reader/Writer from APSX [15] provides the interface 
functionality for the ISO15693 tags we are using.  The module requires TTL level inputs 
and has an integral antenna that operates at a frequency of 13.56MHz.  The baud rate for 
this module is 19200bit per second and it has a read/write range that is a 4 inch radius 
(cone shape). 
 
Integrated antenna 
Figure 3.6.  RW-210 module 
 
The wireless data exchange between the RW-210 and a tag is not encrypted and 
therefore is susceptible to attack, however, the short range would make this very difficult 
as the patient would be able to visually detect a sniffing device placed close enough to be 
effective.  Though the communication is wireless, we will assume that this is not a great 
concern. 
 
3.2. RFID tag 
The RI-TH1-CB1A tag from Texas Instruments [11] is an ISO 15963 compliant 
device and is approximately the size of a standard credit card.  It has a maximum storage 
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capacity of 64 blocks of raw data, where each block holds 32-bits for a total capacity of 
2048 bits.  Each tag is assigned a 64-bit UID by the manufacturer at the time of 
production, which may not be modified.  The tags are readily available and have a cost of 
a few dollars.   
 
 
Figure 3.7.  Tag memory structure 
(Source: TI data sheet for RI-TH1-CB1A [11] ) 
 
 
3.3. Wireless Radios 
The wireless transmitters we selected are the HN-550.  These are 2.4GHz wireless 
data modems [24] and are ideal for this particular application, as they have a 9-pin serial 
interface and are frequency hopping devices.  This means that unless the hopping pattern 
is known, the transmission can not be intercepted as a whole transmission, only portions 
and thus offers a level of protection from an attack.  Another desirable feature is that the 
HN-550 is capable of point-to-point or point-to-multipoint networks making it possible to 
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have multiple users in the same location without interference from one another or 
increasing the transmission range by hopping the transmissions through multiple units. 
 
Figure 3.8  HN-550 wireless radio 
 
 
We have described what the key components of the system are, in the next 
chapter we will focus on the specifics pertaining to security protocol we implemented. 
 
   20
Chapter 4 Security Protocol 
4.1. Protocol selection 
Several security protocols were examined and considered for implementation as 
reviewed in Section 1.1.  The driving factors for the selection of chain hashing are; 
 Light weight protocol 
 Protocol that can eventually be implemented on tag circuitry 
 Computations will be contained in limited resource microcontroller 
A light weight algorithm, meaning an algorithm having less complexity in order 
to reduce overhead, is needed to achieve the proposed goal.  There are other approaches 
to achieve secure communications, such as PRNG and block matrices.  However, to 
comply with the forward secure component, a PRNG would need to be synchronized 
between reader and tag which would require additional circuitry and power.  Block 
matrices are not as strong as the forward secure cryptographic chaining hash.   
Another factor is the tag itself.  Although current technology has not done so at 
the present time, this protocol must be able to be realized in to the tag circuitry.  The 
small size of the tag IC must be retained therefore the gate size must be kept as small as 
possible.  In [25] it was shown by using a 0.13μm CMOS standard cell library that the 
SHA-1 circuit would be approximately 8k to 10k gates and the MD5 circuit would use 
approximately 10k to 18k gates.  These were gate counts for independent circuits; it may 
be possible to combine common components to use fewer gates which may yield a 
smaller unit cost as well as have small power requirements to carry out the necessary 
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hashing operations.  The gate layout is not in the scope of our thesis and is not 
investigated further. 
The digest computation is to be entirely performed on the reader device which is 
an 8-bit microcontroller.  Microcontrollers are not designed like a back end severs nor do 
they have commensurate resources, therefore the protocol must be straightforward yet 
provide security at a sufficient level.  Another advantage, the cryptographic hashes 
generate result of known length, this is valuable when using an 8-bit device with limited 
memory storage capabilities. 
Based on our needs and the extensive supporting research in [21], the decision to 
use chaining hashes was made. 
 
4.2. Forward-secure chain hashing 
Forward security is the confidentiality of previous messages, meaning that data 
transmitted today shall remain secure in the future, such that even if the future message 
contents are discovered, there is no way to correlate the current and future digests.   
One potential method to achieving forward security is to use one of the 
fundamental primitives in cryptography known as a hashing function, sometimes called a 
“one-way” hashing function.  The hashing function maps a bit string of arbitrary length, 
known as a message, to a bit string of fixed length, called a digest, thereby preventing 
unauthorized retrieval of the original bit string.  The way this algorithm operates makes it 
improbable to derive the message from the digest.  
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 Figure 4.1  Hash function 
 
To take the one-way hash a step further, the algorithm can be applied successively 
to a message, which is known as hash chaining.  This method can easily produce multiple 
one-time keys from a single message that are difficult to decode.  Equation 1 shows 
function h(x) which is a hash chain of length 3. 
 
     xhxhhh 3   Equation 1 
 
 Reference [12] defines “A one-way hash function is a hash function that satisfies 
the property that f(m) is “easy” to compute for all m   M, but for randomly chosen c in 
the image of f, finding an m   M such that c = f(m) is computationally infeasible, namely 
we can easily compute f, but it is computationally infeasible to compute f -1.” 
 In [1], Ohkubu, et al. propose using an initial message, si, apply hash chaining 
and update the message for the next transaction.  Here the tag would store the 
information, si , send the digest ai = G(si), and then renew its secret to si+1 = H(si) based 
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on the previous message.  Forward security is implemented by making use of two one-
way hash functions, H and G, to calculate the digest.   
 
 
Figure 4.2  RFID privacy scheme 
 
This scheme provides the forward security we require.  If ai is discovered, G is a 
one-way hashing function, therefore si can not be revealed.  H is also a one-way hashing 
function, so if the tag contents are discovered, si can not be distinguished from si+1.   
On the server, a database of tag identifications and messages, (ID, si), is 
maintained.  When the server receives the tag output, it will calculate the G(Hi(s1)) and 
would verify the received digest matches the calculated digest. 
 
4.3. Protocol application 
Our implementation does not require a back end server, and the computational 
requirements of the protocol are contained in the reader’s microcontroller.  The reader is 
not intended to service a vast number of patients and because of that does not need to 
have a large memory section.  The tag/patient database is to be stored in the 
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microprocessors non-volatile memory so it can be retained through power cycles.  The 
one-way hash functions chosen were primarily with the digest length as criterion.  We 
selected the SHA-1 and MD5 functions to demonstrate the operation of the our chosen 
algorithm, other functions, for example SHA-2 or the winner of the SHA-3 competition, 
could be used in place of the SHA-1 to provide additional strength.  The length of the 
second function needed to be as short as possible while balancing encryption strength.    
The first hash is done using the SHA-1 functions designed by the NSA [7],[8].  
With a maximum message length of (264-1), the digest produced is 160-bits long.  Our 
input message is limited to 9 ASCII characters, but may be increased if warranted. 
 
 
Figure 4.3  SHA-1 generation 
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The second hash is done using the MD5 function [9] designed by R.L. Rivest 
commonly used for file download integrity.  MD5 produces a 128-bit digest in our 
application and uses the SHA-1 digest as the input message.  The shorter digest length of 
16bytes was desired to maximize the number of digests to be programmed on a single 
tag.  If a different function is implemented in this part, the effect would be that the total 
number of digests stored on the tag would be reduced as the tag memory is fixed.   
 
 
Figure 4.4  MD5 block diagram 
 
The tags are not capable of computation, only data storage; therefore, we can not 
have a fully compatible system that is specified by [1] where the tag generates the digest 
in real time when requested.  In lieu of an intelligent tag, we will program and store the 
MD5 digest on the tag to be scanned by the reader.   
 
4.4. Tag authentication process 
The process of authentication begins with the programming of the reader.  At the 
time of commissioning, a tag is scanned to obtain its valid UID.  After verifying the tag 
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has not been entered previously, the patient ID number, message and number of hashing 
iterations to chain are all entered in and stored to the reader’s microprocessor memory.  
By allowing any length message, up to 9 characters, and an unknown number of 
iterations to chain ranging from 16 to 133, the message will remain secure from 
discovery.       
The tag is only able to store 16 digests at any time, and to generate the digest data, 
a separate console application called fshash is used.  The fshash application requires the 
same message and a number of iterations to generate the final 16 digests in the series of 
hashes.  These resulting 16 digests can be programmed on to the tag at any time using the 
reader and GUI interface. 
Once in service, the reader is remotely instructed via a RS232 serial port to 
authenticate a tag and signals the patient to place the tag to be scanned.  The identity of 
the tag is checked against the entries in memory, and if the UID is not found, the process 
ends.  If the entry is present, the reader reads the stored values for the message and 
number of iterations and calculates h(hn-1(message)) = hn(message).  This is the digest we 
are expecting to read on the tag.  The reader then reads from memory the tag block 
number that corresponds to the 16 digests on the tag, and issues a command to the read 
tag memory contents of that location.   
For example, we have entered the following: 
Message: test 
Iterations: 38 
The application provides digests 22 through 38 and these are programmed on to 
tag memory mapped as 22 → block1, 23 → block2, successively to 38 → block16.  On 
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request h(h(h36(test))) = digest iteration 36, a request for the contents of tag memory 
block_14 is issued. 
 
Table 4.1  Tag memory assignments 
 
 The reader compares the calculated digest with the one received from the tag.  If 
the information is a match, an LED validates the patient using the reader and a 
confirmation text is sent to the remote user.  Following the positive confirmation, the 
iteration number and tag block numbers on the reader memory are decremented by one 
and stored for the next authentication request.  The current digest (the digest just 
authenticated) is updated with next digest in line for subsequent authentications.  For 
example, in Table 4.1 the last digest to be authenticated is h22(digest).  When a 
authentication for h38(digest) is successfully completed, the digest is updated with 
h21(digest), the next digest needed following the data in block_1.  This complies with the 
forward secure requirement to overwrite the digest that was immediately used.   
If they do not match, an LED indicates the failure to the patient and a failure text 
is sent to the remote user.  In this case, the reader memory is unchanged.  All of the 
information exchanged is reported back to an authorized user via the RS232 serial port.  
   28
Note that the serial exchange between reader and display is not encrypted for use in this 
thesis, but can be implemented if desired. 
We have explained the security protocol and how the authentication takes place, 
in the next chapter we discuss the various software tools and interfaces to use the RFID 
system. 
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Chapter 5 Work Environment 
5.1. fshash 
The console application, fshash, was written to assist in the tag digest 
programming.  The application prompts for a message that can be any value up to 9 
characters in length.  The reason for this is that initially the patient’s Social Security 
Number was intended for use, however, any value may be assigned.  The message entry 
whether intended as numerical or text, is used as an ASCII value, so it is possible to have 
control characters, such as LF (line feed), as a resulting value.  To prevent this from 
occurring, we have, for the purpose of this thesis, limited the range to 16 through 133.  
ASCII value ‘z’ may have 133 increments before it will enter the control character 
values. 
 
Figure 5.1  Screenshot of fshash console application 
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The SHA-1 and MD5 algorithms are publicly available and provided free of 
charge on several web sites.   fshash will generate the digests we are interested in and 
write three output files, one for the SHA-1 digests, two for the MD5 digests.   
The SHA-1 file, named “sha1-out.txt”, was used to verify the hash results and 
each digest is the input message for the following MD5 algorithm. 
 
 
Figure 5.2.  SHA-1 digest for message “Test” 
 
The first MD5 file, “md5-out.txt”, is the entire digest as will be generated by the 
reader.  This file is intended as useful information for the user.   
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 Figure 5.3.  MD5 digest for message “Test” 
 
The second, md5-out-fmt.txt”, is a duplicate of the first with a delineating space 
written between each byte of digest for programming purposes.  The data must be entered 
with this format to the interface application to program the tag.  For convenience, it may 
now be copy/paste as is in to the SerialComm GUI user interface.  
 
Figure 5.4.  Formatted MD5 results for digest “Test” 
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 fshash is written in the C language using the Code::Blocks ® open source 
programming environment [19].  
 
5.2. Embedded firmware 
The firmware for the microprocessor was written using AVRStudio4®, Atmel’s® 
free Windows IDE using the GCC compiler [17].  All source code development and 
debug was done using the AVR® JTAGICE mkII [18] from Atmel®, a development tool 
for On-chip Debugging with IEEE 1149.1 compliant JTAG interface.  Chapter 5 details 
the primary components of the source code. 
 
Figure 5.5.  AVR® JTAGICE mkII 
 
5.3. SerialComm 
The user interface for the system, SerialComm, is a basic serial communications 
GUI application for use with the Windows operating system.  This application is not 
specifically required as the instructions to the reader are simple text and hexadecimal 
inputs.  The application was written using the C++ Builder 6 IDE from Borland®. 
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 Figure 5.6.  SerialComm GUI 
 
 
The lower left portion of the GUI is the host communication port selection 
options. When the application is launched, it searches for available all communications 
ports and presents only the active ports.  The communications options, 38400bps, 8-N-1, 
have been selected as shown in Figure 5.6.  The settings may be saved for future use.  
The text box located above the Transmit button is where all user selections are 
entered. To send data, the user must click the Transmit button.  When programming the 
tag digest data, the Tag data check box must be selected, and this will send the data as 
hexadecimal values. 
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5.4. Programming menu 
The program option presents several selections.  The user may choose to enter 
new tags, edit or remove existing tags, or program tag digests individually, or all blocks 
at once. 
 
Figure 5.7.  SerialComm programming options 
 
To enter a new tag the user must enter the following: 
a. Tag number which in our version can be between 1 and 10. 
b. The 9 digit patient ID 
c. The secret key (also called message) 
d. Number of iterations which in our version can be between 16 and 133 
All entries are confirmed after each entry is made. 
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 Figure 5.8.  New tag entry 
 
Once a tag is entered, it may be entirely removed or fields Patient ID, Secret Key 
or Iterations may be updated.  Each update is confirmed as it is made.  The tag digest is 
easily programmed.  If the entire 16 blocks are selected, the user enters the data, checks 
“Tag data” and clicks the Transmit button.  If single digests are selected, the user 
indicates which block to program, specifies the single digest to program, checks “Tag 
data” and clicks the Transmit button. 
5.5. Authentication 
To authenticate a patient, the user selects the authenticate option, the reader will 
indicate to the patient by flashing the LED and printing an asterisk every second on the 
SerialComm window.  Once the patient places the tag on the reader, the authentication 
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initiates and indicates the results.  The reader will indicate one of three possibilities, the 
tag was not found in memory meaning it was never entered, authentication failed, or 
authentication confirmed. 
 
Figure 5.9  Authentication FAIL 
 
Figure 5.10  Authentication CONFIRMED 
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Having articulated the software environments and their use, the next chapter will 
detail the RFID reader and tag at a system level.  
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Chapter 6 Embedded Code 
The embedded source code is loaded in to the microprocessor; this code dictates the 
behavior of the reader device.  The following sections illustrate the essential components 
of the embedded code. 
 
6.1. State diagram 
The RFID reader has the following normal operating states, READY, 
PROGRAM, and AUTHENTICATE.  The RESET can be initiated at any time and will 
go the READY state.  Transitions between states are governed by the following state 
diagram. 
START
READY
PROGRAM AUTH
RESET
 
Figure 6.1  Reader state diagram 
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6.2. Program flow 
The RFID reader system software is a repetitive cycle, the program flow is 
described in the chart in Figure 6.2.  The system waits at the ready state until the user 
enters a request for action.  The authentication action follows through with tag 
verification and returns to the ready state.  The program action prompts for the user to 
select what to program and then processes that request.  After programming, the system 
returns to the ready state. 
 
6.3. Firmware 
The RFID reader system is governed by a small event driven real time operating 
system.   The system has soft time requirements and is not life critical.  The notable 
attributes are discussed in the following sections.  
 
6.3.1 Clock source 
The reader circuit uses an external ceramic chip resonator at a frequency of 
7.3728MHz.  This component was selected because the frequency (4×1.8432 MHz) 
allows integer division to common to baud rates reducing the bit error rate in serial 
communications.  The resonator has built-in capacitors and needs only to be connected to 
the XTAL1 (pin 24) and XTAL2 (pin 23) pins of the ATmega64 microcontroller.  The 
fuse settings must be set accordingly. Section 6.3.4 provides additional details. 
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Figure 6.2  High level program flow chart 
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6.3.2 Reset  
The reader may be issued a hard reset by pressing the only pushbutton in the 
circuit tied to the RESET pin.  This action is an “absolute jump” command, the 
equivalent of cycling power on the reader.  This will cause the system to begin execution 
at instruction 0x0000 and reset all I/O resources on the ATmega64.  A reset command 
does not erase the contents of the NV memory.   
 
6.3.3 JTAG 
The ATmega64 is capable of JTAG interface, which allows for flash memory 
programming and in-circuit debug.  This functionality is very important as the 
ATmega64 is a SMT part meaning it is not easily removable.  DIP components may be 
removed by simply unplugging; this is not the case for SMT components.  Once SMT 
components are soldered in place there are a finite number of times the component can be 
soldered and removed before the board pads are damaged.  JTAG enables the embedded 
software development to continue while the microcontroller is still installed in the circuit.  
The modified code can be uploaded and tested as frequently as needed without the 
removal of the microcontroller.  Four pins of the ATmega64 in Port F (PF5 – PF7) are 
required to attach the AVR® JTAGICE mkII to utilize the interface. 
 
6.3.4 Fuse settings 
The fuse settings are the configuration bits for the ATmega64 that allows the for 
the set up of the various aspects of the microcontroller such as boot flash size, enable 
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JTAG interface, the clock to run (external crystal, internal oscillator) and to save the 
EEPROM memory contents on power cycles.  To permanently lock the microcontroller, 
the lock bits may be set, thereby preventing further access.    
 
 
Figure 6.3  ATmega64 fuse settings 
 
6.3.5 Communication ports 
Two true dedicated serial communications ports are available in the ATmega64 
microcontroller.  One named USART0 is used for the host-reader communication, the 
other named USART1 is for the module-reader communications.  Setup for each is 
shown in Table 6.1. 
 
   43
PORT LINE DIRECTION INTERFACE USART BAUD 
PE0 Rx From Host 0 38400 
PE1 Tx To Host 0 38400 
PD2 Rx From RW-210 1 19200 
PD3 Tx To RW-210 1 19200 
Table 6.1  ATmega64 data communications setup 
 
The hardware interrupt service routine vectors, USART0_Rx_vect, 
USART1_Rx_vect, USART0_Tx_vect and USART1_Tx_vect,are defined in 
“avr/iom64.h” to indicate the reader has just received a character or finished sending the 
contents of the output buffer respectively.  To transmit a message, we monitor the Tx 
complete interrupt, which is set when the last byte is sent out.  On the receive side, the Rx 
complete interrupt is set when a single byte is received.  To ensure that all serial data has 
adequate time to buffer, 20ms software delays are used where needed.  This allows 
sufficient time for all packet bytes to be read in completely before any parsing is done. 
 
6.4. Data structures 
The tag data relates to the patient and this is stored in a struct in the 
microcontroller memory.  The struct is shown in Figure 6.4.  The information contains 
everything required for the authentication process. 
struct tag 
{ 
 BYTE uid[UID_LENGTH];  
 BYTE patient_id[P_ID_LENGTH];  
 BYTE key[KEY_LENGTH];   
 BYTE n_val;     
 BYTE next_dig_read;    
 BYTE next_dig_prog;    
}; 
Figure 6.4  Tag-Patient data structure 
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 The first three struct members are set when the tag is commissioned and last three struct 
members are updated on each tag authentication.  This information will remain intact 
between system power cycles.  The struct is mirrored in the configuration registers. 
 
6.4.1 Configuration registers 
The RFID reader will have the following parameters stored in NV memory. 
Register Number Register name Size Description 
0x00 uid 12 Unique ID 
0x0C patient_id 9 Patient’s ID 
0x15 key 9 Input message 
0x1E n_val 1 Iteration number 
0x1F next_dig_read 1 Next digest to be read 
0x20 next_dig_prog 1 Next digest to be programmed 
Table 6.2  NV memory configuration register 
 
uid   unique identification number of the tag 
patient_id  patient’s ID assigned by the care facility 
key   input message to be encrypted 
n_val   iteration number for encryption 
next_dig_read next digest to be read in authentication 
next_dig_read next available tag block for programming 
 
Figure 6.5  Configuration register definitions 
 
There are 10 identical tag records allotted in our firmware, therefore each tag 
entry record will be offset by 32 bytes.  The ATmega64 can hold 2k bytes of data in NV 
memory, giving a possibility of 60 tag records per reader if required.  The total number of 
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tag records that may be used is defined in our source code, it is not a feature modifiable 
by the end user. 
 
6.5. Messaging formats 
The following protocol format has been defined for the RFID reader to use in 
communications with the RW-210 module.  All messages between the reader and RW-
210 module must contain CRC bytes appended to the message. 
 
6.5.1 CRC 
The CRC-16 formatting is a basic XOR scheme using a “Preset Value” and a 
“Polynomial”.    A number of bytes specified in the function parameters are processed in 
the CRC calculation and, once determined, the 16-bit CRC is returned.  The pseudo code 
is shown in Figure 6.6. 
 
Initialize the 16-bit remainder (CRC) to 0xFFFF 
 
Loop: 
XOR the 8-bit data byte with the CRC 
 
Shift the CRC 1 bit to the right 
Increment shift count 
 
Is the bit shifted out to the right a 1 or a 0? 
If 1, XOR CRC with generating polynomial 
If 0, shift CRC right 1 bit 
  
Repeat LOOP 7 more times 
 
1’s complement CRC 
Format CRC, swap high and low order bytes 
Return CRC value 
 
Figure 6.6  CRC pseudo code 
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 This CRC is appended to any data communication going to and coming from the RW-210 
module. 
 
6.5.2 Tag data programming 
To program the tag, an instruction must be sent with the format in Figure 6.7.  
The packet can hold 4-bytes of data.  A digest is 16-bytes in length, therefore there are 4 
separate packets required when programming a single digest.  The full digest is parsed 
into four parts, appended with the CRC, and sent to the RW-210 module for transmission 
to the tag.  The same function is used to program a single digest or the full 16 digests. 
Bytes ExpSOP
0
Flag
1 3
Block
2
Cmd
4
D2D1
5
D3
6
D4
7 8
CRC1
9
CRC2
10
 
Figure 6.7  Write tag block message format 
 
The individual bytes are defined as: 
SOP Start Of Packet – indicates number of bytes in 
complete packet following this byte 
Bytes Exp Number of bytes expected in reply 
Flag ISO15693 specific, sets option flag, data rate and 
sub carrier 
Block  Tag block to write 
Cmd  ISO15693 tag instruction command 
D1 – D4 Data bytes 1 through 4 
CRC1  High byte of CRC 
CRC2  Low byte of CRC 
 
Figure 6.8  Tag message definitions 
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To generate the correct CRC bytes, the first two bytes of the write command are 
excluded in the calculation.  The format to forward to the CRC function is shown in 
Figure 6.9. 
SOP Bytes Exp Flag Block Cmd D1 D2 D3 D4 CRC1 CRC2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
BlockFlag
2
D1Cmd
3 4 5 6
D2 D4D3
7 8
 
Figure 6.9  CRC-16 format for tag block programming 
 
After determining the CRC, the result must be appended as well as bytes 0 and 1, prior to 
issuing the instruction. 
 
6.5.3 Get UID 
The UID may be requested from any tag by using one of two commands, the get_uid or 
fast_uid.  The get command is formatted as shown in Figure 6.10 
 
SOP
0
Bytes Exp
1
Flag
2
Cmd
3
Blk Num
4 65
CRC1 CRC2
 
Figure 6.10  Get UID instruction 
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The get UID frame bytes are: 
SOP  Start Of Packet - number of bytes following this byte 
Bytes Exp Number of response bytes 
Flag ISO15693 specific, sets option flag, data rate and 
sub carrier 
Cmd  ISO15693 inventory command 
Blk Num Block number to read 
CRC1  High byte of CRC 16 
CRC2  Low bye of CRC16 
 
Figure 6.11  get_UID message definitions 
 
The 12 byte response is the tag ID with the two CRC bytes appended at the end.  The 
fast_uid command is 0xFA and it serves the same purpose as the get_uid command.  The 
advantages of this command are convenience and speed, and there are 6 less bytes to send 
for each transmission.  The response to fast_uid command is the same as the get_uid 
command.  
Having described the user interfaces, the system components, and firmware 
operations in the previous chapters, we will deploy the system in our test environment 
and review the results in the next chapter.   
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Chapter 7 Testing and Results 
7.1. Encryption results 
Two hashing algorithms, SHA-1 and MD5, are used to produce the digest 
encoded on each tag.  The firmware digest produced was compared against a digest 
produced using a freeware application called HashCalc [23]. 
 
   
Input message
Resulting digest
Figure 7.1  SHA-1 digest comparison 
 
Using the input message “TEST” with 32 iterations of hashing, the digests are 
shown in Figure 7.1.    Applying the iterations will update the message to the ASCII 
string “TESt”.  The last line in “sha1-out.txt” matches the value in HashCalc. 
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Input message 
Final digest 
Figure 7.2  MD5 digest comparison 
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The file “md5-out.txt” shows the final digest for the input message (the digest 
from SHA-1) “120b9b60d9eb0a0ef37cb334c9c37d213b34e24d”.  The values 
generated by HashCalc and the firmware are shown in Figure 7.2.  The MD5 result is the 
final digest and is encoded on the tag at block 16.  
 
7.2. Scan range 
Scanning range of a high frequency RFID tag is less than 3 meters per the 
standard, however, this ideal and very dependant on the reader circuit parameters and 
environment in which the system is deployed. 
 
 
Figure 7.3  RFID read range 
(Source:  How to Cheat at Deploying and Securing RFID [20] ) 
 
The RW-210 module is capable of reading at a maximum range of 7 inches according to 
the manufacturer [15].  When tested in an environment that has no metal or magnetic 
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fields (e.g. computer speakers) in proximity of the tag or module antenna, we achieved a 
scan distance of 3.5 inches.  For our use in our deployment, this is acceptable.  The 
shorter distance is sufficient since our application is a patient that is deliberately passing 
their officially issued tag across the reader antenna.  An ancillary advantage is that the tag 
may not be maliciously scanned at long distance by an attacker. 
 
7.3. System performance 
The system was tested in a normal residential setting with average appliances and 
services.  There may be additional circumstances (i.e. medical equipment) that could 
skew the results found here. 
One of the HN-550 radios which we named the base was attached to the host PC 
via a serial port and the second radio named the remote was attached to the reader.  First 
the radios were indoors, positioned 50 feet apart in a residential environment and worked 
correctly with no perceivable time delays in transmission.  Next the radios were tested 
with one radio outside and the other indoors at a range of 100 feet, the system again 
performed correctly with no perceivable time delays in transmission.  The HN-550 data 
sheet specifies a range of 1000 feet indoors, and, based on our testing, this range should 
be feasible with greater ranges possible using multiple radios to hop the transmissions. 
 
7.3.1 Computation time 
Computation and response time are of importance in the use of the system, as it 
must be able to confirm or deny patient identity in an expedient manner.  After a tag is 
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scanned, our reader can perform real-time dual hash calculations, query the tag block for 
the digest, authenticate and display the results within a time frame of two seconds.   
The longest operation is a response to the get_digest command.  By examining the 
data transfer rate of this exchange, we will obtain a benchmark time to compare against.  
The communication rate between the microcontroller and RW-210 module is set at 
19200bps.  The get_digest instruction issued by the reader shown in Figure 7.4 is 8bytes 
long (64bits), so the time required is as follows. 
 
 
Figure 7.4  Get digest instruction 
 
Instruction = 8bytes x 8bits =  64 bits 
19200bps = 19.2 bits per millisecond 
64 bits ÷ 19.2  =   3.33ms  (ideal transfer rate) 
 
We show that approximately 3ms is needed for the microcontroller to send the get 
digest instruction to the RW-210 module.  Once the instruction is sent, there is a 50ms 
software delay inserted to allow for the tag response (the digest) to be buffered.  The 
response shown in Figure 7.5 is 19 bytes long so the time required is as follows.  
 
 
Figure 7.5  Digest reply message 
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 Response = 19 bytes  x 8bits =   152 bits 
19200bps = 19.2 bits per millisecond 
152 bits ÷ 19.2  =   7.91ms  (ideal transfer rate) 
 
 We show that approximately 60ms is needed for the microcontroller to read the 
digest data from the RW-210 module.  The total time required to read a digest from the 
tag would be:  
 
3.33ms + 50ms + 7.91ms   =   61.24 ms 
 
Next we look at the GUI display message for an authentication that passes as this 
is the longest single message sequence.   Figure 5.10 shows the display beginning with 
“Calculated MD5 digest: ” and ending with the new line for the “system ready” prompt.  
The reader to host communication is set at 38400bps and the required time is shown; 
 
163 characters x 8bits per character = 1304 bits 
38400bps = 38.4 bits per millisecond 
1304 bits ÷ 38.4  =  33.9ms 
 
We show that approximately 34ms is needed for the SerialComm application to 
display the authentication status.  The combined ideal communication times (62ms + 
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34ms = 96ms) are less than one tenth (0.100) of a second.  This value is consistent with 
the actual test results we have observed. 
This is comparable to the authorization time required when using an ATM 
machine to access one’s bank account.  This is for a reader attached to a wireless modem, 
as described in Section 3.3 or local host compatible of RS-232 communication, however, 
there may be an additional time delay if the data must be sent over the internet.  The 
internet routing calculations are not part of this thesis. 
 
7.4. System cost 
Our reader is not a production ready device, it is a prototype made from 
perforated substrate intended to be used for rough electronics work typically using 
through-hole components and hand soldered wires.  To be a consumer product, the reader 
would require at minimum a dual layered printed circuit board (PCB) that has electrical 
traces in place of the hand soldered wires and use surface mount technology (SMT) 
components.  The PCB cleans up the design and reduces the possibility of transient 
signals.  The SMT components can reduce the cost of production as it can be automated.  
Also, certifications from the FCC and UL Labs are usually associated with a commercial 
product and must be in compliance.  The design and certification costs are one-time 
expenses that would diminish when amortized over the production life of the product.  
The cost of our prototype is shown in Table 7.1  
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Component Cost 
ATmega64 $12 
MAX233CPE $10 
LEDs and misc. passive components $15 
RW-210 RFID module $55 
Prototype board $  4 
QFP-to-DIP adaptor $10 
Total $106 
Table 7.1  Prototype cost 
 
The cost of a commercial system would also be dependant on the communication 
features of this product.  The most likely features would be an incorporated wireless radio 
transmitter or an embedded Ethernet module to increase the range of deployment beyond 
our testing configuration.  Either option can be obtained as a daughter card and attached 
to the microcontrollers serial communication pins. 
A commercial version would not use the prototyping board or the DIP adaptor, 
and the component costs would be much less when purchased in quantities of 1000 or 
more.  A commercial product will also need to be enclosed to protect the components and 
require some form of retail packaging, which all adds to the product cost.  If a deployed 
system was to use the HN-550 wireless radio, the units are readily available at major 
distributors and cost approximately $550 each.  The radios were already in our inventory 
and were not a cost factor for our system. 
The benefit of our system is that a population of 60 people can be serviced with a 
single reader.  By utilizing this reader in lieu of a backend server, the maintenance costs 
of a server with its associated cast are mitigated.  Due to the fact that our reader can 
interface with any RS-232 compatible device, there is no need for specific software.  Our 
test system used a wireless radio eliminates the need for a network Ethernet 
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infrastructure, and may be deployed anywhere.  Based on these criteria, it is reasonable to 
say that our standalone reader would cost less than a dedicated backend server used in the 
typical systems deployed today.  
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Chapter 8 Conclusion 
8.1. Closing remarks 
Telemedicine is slowly gaining favor and is being introduced into health care 
facilities, but still faces criticism for security obstacles that need to be resolved.  We 
showed that despite current RFID tag technology not being capable of real time 
encryption calculations, we can deploy a system that is able to conceal the patient’s 
identity.     
In this thesis we set out to investigate a means of ensuring the confidentiality of a 
patient’s identity when using remote medical consultation referred to as telemedicine.  
We intended to show that patient identity verification was viable with RFID and that a 
typical backend server driven RFID system could be streamlined to perform the 
verification without a server.   
 Our RFID system is uses dual chain hashing establishing forward security in the 
authentication process between reader and tag.  The authentication process is 
compartmentalized in the reader, and we do not require a back end server to provide the 
intelligent query to the tag as typical systems do.    Our system communicates with any 
device that has a standard RS232 serial communications port and basic serial 
communications software eliminating the need for complex interfaces.  Our system also 
reduces the risk of a backend server compromise by limiting the patient roster to 60 or 
less patients.  In the event of a compromise, only the location to which the reader is 
assigned is affected, not the entire care facility.  In this thesis, we have demonstrated that 
our embedded version of the RFID system is indeed viable and offers benefits to the 
   59
current backend server based systems being commissioned in care facilities adopting 
telemedicine. 
8.2. Areas for future research 
There are several areas for future research and development. 
 The development of a computational tag would be a key addition to the proposed 
RFID authentication system.  Computational capability would eliminate the 
described method of digest storage on the tag, thereby making simultaneous real 
time calculations possible on both reader and tag.  That event will result in the 
verification process being invulnerable to attacks.  Even if the data exchange was 
intercepted, the attacker would not be able to reverse the digest and discover the 
message.   
 The integration of the Ethernet module or cell phone interface would give the 
RFID verification system the ability to be deployed anywhere the respective 
service is available.  That greatly increases the deployment possibilities in 
modernized environments, but does not include all scenarios.  The wireless radio 
tested solves our specific dilemma.  A system that is capable of all three mediums 
would give the optimal deployment option, however the cost could be drastically 
increased.  An investigation to implement this robust device would be of interest.      
 Our system was intentionally developed to be capable of a simple interface so any 
device could communicate with it.  The development of a comprehensive 
software application with user interfaces for the care provider and patient would 
make the system a better product offering.   
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